The impact of quantitative easing on commercial banks: evidence from the Euro Area by Montez, Filipa Alves
A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Master Degree in 





The Impact of Quantitative Easing on Commercial Banks 
Evidence from the Euro Area 
 
Filipa Alves Montez, 






A Project carried out on the Master in Finance Program, under the supervision of: 
Professor Paulo M. M. Rodrigues 
 
Lisbon, May 26th, 2017  





Most of the studies tend to analyze the impact of quantitative easing (QE) on financial markets 
and at a macroeconomic level, not giving enough attention to the impact of this unconventional 
monetary policy on commercial banks. The impact of QE on 24 commercial banks based on 
the Euro Area will be investigated in this study, using publicly available panel data. This work 
project suggests that the European Central Bank’s (ECB) QE purchases, since the start of the 
program in January 2015, had a statistically significant increase but small effect in the growth 
of bank’s loans. Moreover, through a robustness check, it is observed that QE’s impact is bigger 
in small banks.  
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In order to stimulate the financial economy after the global financial crisis in 2008, the ECB, 
the Federal Reserve (FED) and other major Central Banks took the initiative to look for 
unconventional measures. Most studies concerning unconventional monetary policies focus on 
the United States of America (USA), the United Kingdom (UK) and Japanese. 
The ECB QE program started in January 2015. On January 22th, a massive program of asset 
acquisitions was launched by the ECB – The Public Sector Purchase Program (PSPP) -, in order 
to complement previous programs, such as ECB’s Asset Backed Securities and Covered Bonds 
Purchase Programs (ABSPP and CBPP3). Under PSPP, sovereign bonds held by Euro Area 
governments and securities held by institutions and other national agencies will acquired by the 
ECB. According to the ECB, the purchases will be continued until “a sustained adjustment in 
the path of inflation which is consistent with the aim of achieving inflation rates below, but 
close to, 2 percent over the medium term” (Draghi, 2015a). 
In contrast with other studies, this work project takes into account publicly available data, from 
sources, such as Bloomberg, ECB and Worldbank database, to study how much these 
unconventional monetary policies took impact on Commercial Banks in the Euro Area, by 
influencing the growth of its lending. A panel data set was created for 24 commercial banks of 
the Euro Area during a period of 68 quarters (from March 1999 to December 2016). 
In the following section a literature review concerning the main features related with 
unconventional monetary policies and QE in the USA, the UK and Japan will be presented. In 
the section 3, the methodology, data source and the main characteristics of the data will be 
displayed. The results’ analysis will be explained in Section 4. Section 5, will summarize the 
work done and final conclusions. 
  




2 Literature Review 
The bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers resulted in the break of confidence in financial markets, 
in banks, leading to a decrease in lending. According to Paulson (2008) “we had a system-wide 
crisis. Credit markets froze and banks substantially reduced interbank lending. Confidence was 
seriously compromised throughout our financial system. Our system was on the verge of 
collapse, a collapse that would have significantly worsened and prolonged the economic 
downturn that was already underway.” 
2.1 Quantitative Easing: What is it? 
Quantitative Easing, the unconventional monetary policy, consists in a massive asset purchase 
program (APP) which means that the left side of Central Banks’ balance sheet (BS) is expanded 
through the purchase of public sector debt and private assets with longer maturities, holding the 
assets’ composition constant (Driffill, 2016). The described unconventional measure is the most 
common and leads to "a shift in the composition of the assets of the Central Bank towards less 
liquid and riskier assets holding constant the size of the balance sheet" (Buiter, 2008). 
A large-scale asset purchase tend to affect the interest rate through many channels, as for 
example, increasing companies’ investment and the consumption of households, and the 
capacity of banks to grant credit (lend). Moreover, inflation and economic growth  are affected 
by all of these effects. QE increases bank’s liquidity by reducing the liquidity price premium 
and increasing the government bond yields. Nevertheless, these effects persist if central banks 
continue to purchase assets (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011).   
According to Demertzis and Wolff (2016a), QE affects bank’s profitability through three 
channels (1) by driving bond prices up, rewarding banks which hold these kind of assets; (2) 
decrease of term spread due to the decline of long-term yields leading to a reduction in loans to 
deposit ratio, so when banks grant a new credit it is difficult to earn a margin income through 




interest gain; last, but not the least (3) QE allows banks to grant more credit, this will improve 
the involving economy and it will allow banks to reduce its non-performing loans (bad loans).  
So, bank’s profitability can be both positively and negatively affected by QE, but in the 
beginning the impact should be positive. In conclusion, Demertzis and Wolff (2016a), is not 
concerned with a substantial negative impact on bank’s profitability due to the ECB’s QE 
program. This can be explain due to Bank’s risk aversion created since the latest financial crisis, 
which lead to the failure of the mechanism and shrinking the credit available to the private 
sector (Olmo and Sanso-Navarro, 2014).  
Bank lending is the main transmission mechanism of monetary strategy and the real economy. 















Figure 1 – Transmission channels of QE (Source: Hausken and Ncube, 2013) 
The objective of unconventional monetary policies, according to Olmo and Sanso-Navarro 
(2014), relies on restoring the bank lending channel and, at the same time, reestablishing the 
other transmission mechanisms. 




2.2  Quantitative Easing around the world 
2.2.1 Quantitative Easing: Evidence from Japan 
The implementation of QE in Japan, occurred before the 2008 financial crisis and most analysts 
reached the conclusion that the goal of stimulating inflation through the increase in the 
aggregate demand was not reached. Nevertheless, there is a possibility that QE little or positive 
effects were mitigated by the negative effects of Japan’s economy bubble. The economist 
Richard Werner was the one who introduced QE in Japan, proposing it in 1994 (Visconti and 
Quirici, 2015), although Japan only introduced it in March 2001, it was the first country in the 
world applying such policy. The first program lasted for 5 years and other QE programs 
followed (Bowman et al., 2011). The goal of implementing QE in Japan was to introduce 
liquidity in the banking system, maintain the overnight interest rate near zero, encouraging bank 
lending. Bowman et al. (2011) used data for 137 banks on a semester basis (since March 2000 
to March 2009) and estimated panel data regressions. This paper aimed to study how effective 
was the monetary policy implemented by the Bank of Japan in boosting bank lending, following 
Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Hosono (2006). The baseline equation is: 
            Δ𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐿𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿
′𝜒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑖,𝑡   (1) 
where 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is the natural log of loans made by bank i at time t, 𝐿𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the liquidity ratio 
for bank i at time t, and 𝜒𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of control variables. The authors found a robust, positive 
and statistically significant effect of QE on bank’s lending. Nevertheless, the boost in credit 
lending was quite small. Another paper concerning the program of QE in Japan, was the one by 
Ugai (2007) that studied the effect of Japanese Government Bonds purchases under QE on 
portfolio balance. The impact on longer-term interest rates was rather small, according to the 
author, since the maximum of Japanese Government Bonds (JGB) held by the Bank (4% of 
GDP) were lower than the FED holdings (12% of GDP) under APP. 




2.2.2 Quantitative Easing: Evidence from the UK 
Most of Bank of England’s studies concerning QE tended to focus more on its impacts at a 
macroeconomic level and in the financial markets. Joyce and Spaltro (2014) focused on 30 UK 
banks, using non-public data in order to study the impact of a substantial acquisition of public 
and private assets in bank’s BS and lending. The Bank of England’s Monetary Policy 
Committee (MPC) declared in March 2009 the implementation of the unconventional monetary 
policy. Bank of England aimed to purchase £200 billion of assets, in the first phase, exclusively 
Government Bonds (Gilts). Later, the Bank of England purchased £175 billion more, bringing 
the total amount of the program to £375 billion. 
This paper focused on the first round of the Bank of England’s purchases during May 2009 and 
May 2010. Joyce and Spaltro (2014) investigated the relationship among the growth of bank 
lending and the evolution in deposits over assets. The baseline equation is: 
Δ𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝐿)Δ𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾(𝐿)Δ𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿(𝐿)Δ𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇
′𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃
′𝐴𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡    (2) 
where  Δ𝑙𝑖𝑡 is quarterly lending growth for bank i in period t, Δ𝐷𝑖𝑡is changes in the deposits 
over assets ratio, Δ𝐶𝑖𝑡 is changes in published regulatory capital (capital over risk-weighted 
assets), 𝐼𝑖𝑡 is a vector of micro controls and 𝐴𝑡 is a vector of macro controls. 
The authors found that during May 2009 and May 2010 Bank of England’s QE acquisitions 
headed to a statistically significant but minor increase in the growth of bank lending. Moreover, 
the impact was more significant in small rather than in larger banks.  
2.2.3 Quantitative easing: Evidence from the USA 
The FED announced the implementation of QE after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. The 
first round started in 2008 and lasted until 2009, resulting in $600 billion mortgage-backed 
securities purchases and by the end of the program FED held $1.75 trillion of securities among 




other types of assets. After a brief break from the program, the FED decided to take a second 
round of QE in November 2010, buying $600 billion in long-term Treasury Securities (Driffill, 
2016). This policy leaded to an excess reserves resulting in the development of the economy, 
contributing to generate better lending and investment conditions for the banks (Thornton, 
2012). The third round of the QE program started in September 2012 and consisted in $40 
billion monthly purchases of agency mortgage-backed securities in an open-ended program, 
three months later, the monthly purchases increased from $40 to $85 billion (Driffill, 2016). 
Most of studies concerning the impacts of QE in the USA focus on macroeconomic effects 
rather than on banks’ BS. Choulet (2015) studied QE and bank BS based on the USA 
experience. According to this author, in the USA, quantitative easing was accompanied at the 
aggregate level by an unprecedented increase in banks’ reserves with the central bank and in 
customer deposits. In Figure 2, one can see in the first example that at the end of the transaction 
the BS of the central bank remains unchanged, only the composition of debt changes. From the 
commercial bank side, the effect is similar but only the composition of assets change. On the 
other hand, when the counterparty is a non-bank, the commercial bank debits its client’s 
account, everything else remains equal, at the end of the transaction, the size of the bank’s BS 
is reduced in this case. So, if customer’s deposits increases, bank’s liquidity will also increase 








Figure 2 - Impact of QE on Commercial Banks and Customers (Source: Choulet, 2015)  




2.2.4 Quantitative Easing: Evidence from the Euro Area 
Promoting price stability is the main goal of the ECB, as well as to achieve a low and stable 
inflation rate, bellow but close to 2%. In order to achieve this, the ECB used to rely on 
conventional monetary policy instruments, through target interest rates, bank reserve limits and 
changes in money supply through open market operations (European Central Bank, 2011). 
However, the financial crisis of 2008 has brought some challenges for traditional monetary 
policy instruments and central banks (Joyce et al., 2012) which forced the ECB to adopt 
unconventional monetary policy. 
The programs implemented were (1) Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) in October 
2008 which are a three-month liquidity-providing operation and consist in one of the two 
regular open market operations. Through this program, the ECB provides financing to Euro 
Area banks; (2) Covered Bond Purchase Program (CBPP) that was launched in May 2009 and 
the 2nd CBPP Program was launched in October 2011 in order to improve the transmission 
channel of the monetary policy and support lending conditions; (3) Securities Market Program 
(SMP) that was launched in May 2010, which consisted basically of public and private debt 
securities purchases by ECB’s aiming to restore efficiency in the monetary policy transmission 
channel.  
However, none of these programs seemed to provide enough liquidity and confidence to the 
market, mainly due to the default risk on government debt of some countries like Portugal, 
Spain, Italy, and Greece (Driffill, 2016). Following the evidence from Japan, USA and UK, the 
ECB turned to announce the Expanded Asset Purchase Program (EAPP), the unconventional 
monetary policy formally designated by QE, in September 2014. On 22 January 2015, the first 
Public Sector Purchase Program (PSPP) was announced, directed to the purchase of sovereign 
bonds from Euro Area governments and securities from European supranational institutions 




and national agencies. Therefore, PSPP was added to the CBPP3 and to the ABSPP, as we can 
see in Table 1.  It is possible to verify that the ABSPP is the smallest of the three programs and 
the PSPP is the largest of all instruments, where APP represents the total size of all programs.  




At the beginning, January 2015, the ECB’s program aimed to purchase, on a monthly basis, 
€60 billion of assets. In the figure bellow it can be seen how that monthly purchase will be 











Figure 3 - Division of ECB monthly asset purchases (Source: Clays et al, 2015)  
Summing up of the total €60 billion monthly purchase (1) €10 billion on covered bonds and 
asset-backed securities; (2) €50 billion will focus on PSPP where €6 billion correspond to debt 
purchase of supranational institutions placed in the Euro Area (see Table 2 and 3 for the list of 
eligible European institutions) and €44 billion consists on the acquisition of sovereign debt 




securities, of which €4 billion held by the ECB (8% of €50 billion) and €40 billion held by the 






However, there were a 25% issue limit and 33% issuer limit imposed by the ECB  that could 
constrain the length and size of the program. The 25% issue limit, prevents the ECB from 
having a “blocking minority in a debt restructuring involving collective action clauses”, in other 
words, the ECB does not want to have control in case of a possible restructuration of 
government debt, in order to avoid interpretation that the ECB is funding a member country. 
The second limit (33%) is implemented “with the aim of preserving market functioning and 
allowing the formation of a market price on a given security” (ECB, 2015), which will affect 
qualified outstanding debt with 30 years maturity. As expected, these limits were constraining 
the length and size of the program, so in order to continue, the 25% limit was changed to 33% 
when on the 3rd of December 2015 Mario Draghi announced an extension of the program. 
According Clays and Leandro (2016), several changes were made to the initial guidelines of 
QE. The program was set just to last at least until September 2016, now it is expected to sustain 
throughout 2017. The changes were beyond the limit, the monthly asset purchases changed 
from €44 billion to €64 billion and regional and local government bonds were considered fit 
for acquisition, and deposit rate was dropped from - 0.2% to - 0.3%. According to President 
Mario Draghi, the APP  will last “until we see a sustained convergence towards our objective 
Table  2 - Eligible national agencies in the 
Euro Area (Clays et al, 2015) 
Table  3 - Eligible supranational issuers in 
the Euro Area (Clays et al, 2015) 
 




of a rate of inflation which is below but close to 2 percent” (Draghi 2015b), which is not near 






When confronted with the possibility of QE creating price bubbles, Draghi (2015) responded 
that at this moment the ECB did not see any sign of bubbles’ creation. Another risk related to 
this unconventional monetary policy is the decrease in profitability of financial institutions, for 
example, liabilities of life insurance companies have longer maturity than its assets, so the 
company is unprotected if there is a interest rates decrease taking into account the returns 
assured to customers. In Claeys and Darvas (2015)’s opinion, the benefits of QE outweigh their 
potential risks to financial stability.  
Demertzis and Wolff (2016) research ECB’s QE impact on bank profitability, and reached the 
conclusion that QE has not effected yet in a negative perspective bank operations, which were 
expected due to the decrease of interest rates, making it hard for banks to obtain net interest 
margin. Overall, according to this study QE impact at a macroeconomic level has been positive 
lowering long-term yields and increasing the government securities’ price. Bank’s BS is 
strengthened by these positive effects on the financial market. 
However, there is not enough focus on the evolution of credit (as loans). Calza et al. (2003), 
study the relationship between the private sector and loan’s demand in the Euro Area between 
1980 and 1999 with quarterly data and argue that loans’ demand can only be explained by a 
Figure 4 - Inflation outlooks in the euro area (Clays and Leandro, 2016) 




small set of explanatory variables representing general economic activity (Gross Domestic 
Product - GDP) and the cost of loans. The coefficient associated with GDP is positive (1.457) 
while for real short and long-term interest rates is negative (-0.416 and -3.084, respectively). 
The second coefficient, associated with the real long-term interest rate, is much higher, in 
absolute terms, meaning that interest rates with higher maturities have more impact on loans.   
In conclusion, the EAPP was introduced to improve lending conditions to the private sector 
(firms and households), and it is possible to claim, from literature, that there is little sign of the 
impact of this policy on lending conditions. Blattner et al., (2016) study the effects of the EAPP 
through a new comprehensive loan-level data from Portugal, and found some positive evidence 
of its impact at banks exposed to QE both via lower prices and larger quantities.  
2.3 Quantitative Easing and Bank’s Liquidity 
Some authors as Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Kashyap and Stein (2000) see QE as a 
possible lending canal of monetary policy through a positive impact on bank’s liquidity 
converted completely in a growth of lending supply, allowing the other participants of the 
market to finance themselves. If QE goal was to focus on the increase of banking system 
liquidity, it can be anticipated an increase of bank’s liquid assets, as for instance, deposits. 
Additionally, Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011) found that low-capitalizes banks rely 
more on the access to the market, so in the financial crisis, those banks were affect with the 
restrictive access to financial market and had decrease its lending supply.  
Joyce and Spaltro (2014) adapted a version defined by Kashyap and Stein (1994) of a partial 
equilibrium two period model of the bank lending channel. This model takes into account 
bank’s BS has on its asset side illiquid loans (L) and liquid securities (S), as for instance, 
government bonds and on its liability side equity (E), non-deposit liabilities (ND) and deposits 
(D). At the end, the authors reached to a lending supply equation: 










+ 𝜌𝐷1 + (1 − 𝜌)𝐷 + 𝐸1 −
𝛾
2
                (3) 
where 𝑟 is the return, 𝛼 is the cost of non-deposit liabilities, 𝜌 defines the dimension of the 
impact and γ expresses deposit impact’ variance. This equation suggests that a raise in deposits 
will lead to a growth in lending supply, so if QE boosts deposits up it will also impact in the 
same direction bank lending.  
Moreover, as mentioned before it is expected that the impact of QE is different in small and big 
banks, given their difference in accessing capital markets. So, in order to analyze the different 












+ 𝜌                         (4) 
Assuming a simple linear loan demand function:  
𝐿𝐷 = 𝑌 − 𝑘𝑟 
where economic growth (Y) is positive related to loans and loan return, 𝑟, has a  negative 
relation with loans, and the equilibrium condition when there are n banks is: 
𝐿𝐷 = 𝑛𝐿 
By solving it we obtain: 









(𝑌 − 𝑛(𝜌𝐷1 + (1 − 𝜌)𝐷 + 𝐸1 −
𝛾
2
)        (7) 
By differentiating (7) with respect to 𝐷1: 















− 𝑛𝜌)                            (8) 
𝜕𝑟
𝜕𝐷1
 is negative when  
𝜕𝑌
𝜕𝐷1
 is small, meaning that if there is a shock in deposits, markets will not 
be affected much, confirming the existence of a bank lending channel. From equation (4) and 
(5) 
(6) 




(8), for a given change in deposits, banks with higher costs in issuance of non-deposit liabilities 
(e.g. small banks with a high 𝛼1 and 𝛼2) will act more to a change in deposits. On the contrary, 
a change in deposits will not impact as much in the case of large banks. Additionally, in a 
financial crisis, if there is an increase on the non-deposit liabilities’ prices, and QE is 
implemented, there will be a positive relation between QE and bank lending, because banks 
will appeal to this policy. 
The main conclusions focus on (1) positive impact of deposits in bank´s lending supply, so one 
can infer there is a chance that QE will arise bank lending; (2) banks with high levels of capital, 
have a superior bank lending channel; (3) small banks have limitations in accessing capital 
markets, so in a stress situation where deposits are affected, small banks will not have other 
source of funding solutions; and last (4) in a financial crisis, banks will become more exposed, 
since deposits may face a reduction leading to a decrease on the liquidity available to fund 
lending, increasing bank’s cost of raising non-deposits liabilities.  
3 Econometric Methodology  
In this section, the dataset and data sources will be described, and the variables and time period 
used in this research will be defined. This panel dataset is based on publicly available quarterly 
BS data on 24 banks1 since March 1999 until December 2016 (68 time-series across 24 cross-
sections). Since this paper purposes to investigate the impact of QE on commercial banks in the 
Euro Area, all banks are operating only in this area, since ECB’s policies impact directly on 
member countries, even though there is little evidence that other countries can also be affect by 
them. 
                                                          
1 The 24 banks are: Deustche Bank (Germany), Santander (Spain), Unicredit (Italy), ING Group (Netherlands), 
BBVA (Spain), Intesa Sanpaolo Group (Italy), Commerzbank (Germany), Banco de Sabadell (Spain), Erste Bank 
(Austria), Dexia (Belgium), Banca MPS (Italy), Banco Popular Espanhol (Spain), Mediobanca SpA (Italy),Banco 
Comercial Português (Portugal), Bankinter (Spain), BPER Emilia Romagna (Italy), Banca Popolare di Milano 
(Italy), Credito Emiliano (Italy), BPI (Portugal), Banca Carige (Italy), HSBC Trinkaus & Burkhardt (Germany), 
Oberbank AG (Austria), Comdirect bank (Germany) and Bank fur tirol und vorarlberg (Austria). See Annex 1. 




3.1 Description of main variables 
The variable ECB Purchases captures the effect of the QE program that started in 2015 with 
asset monthly purchases by country2. Since each bank is located in an Euro Area country, a 
country/bank allocation was made. Additionally, in this work project the data used is based on 
a quarterly basis, so the ECB Purchase monthly data was summed into quarters.  











Table 4 describes the main statistics of the main variables used in this paper3. Loans were 
obtained from the Bloomberg database, as well as the variable of Deposits and Total Assets 
which contributed to compute the ratio of Deposits over Assets (DoA). Capital consists on the 
quarterly change of the Capital indicator extracted from Bloomberg and the change in the 
                                                          
2 See Annex 2. 
3 See Annex 3. 
Type Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
∆Loans 1704 0,0084 0,1290 -1,9468 0,6590
∆DoA 1704 -0,0154 0,2747 -5,3780 1,1819
∆Capital 1704 -0,0084 0,2443 -4,8264 1,3670
∆PoA 1704 -1,5960 36,448 -1050,727 193,283
∆TA 1704 0,0196 0,107 -0,745 1,812
∆GDP 1728 0,0113 0,0235 -0,0711 0,0564
∆ECBPurchases 1704 1,2162 80,9921 -964,858 1676,728
Inflation 1728 0,0187 0,0119 -0,0151 0,0559
∆Euribor6m 1728 0,0220 0,0160 -0,0021 0,0518
∆Loans 852 0,0076 0,1485 -1,8465 0,6530
∆DoA 852 -0,0352 0,3690 -5,3780 0,8428
∆Capital 852 -0,0114 0,2680 -4,1705 1,3670
∆PoA 852 -1,4677 33,8003 -982,673 9,9935
∆TA 852 0,0226 0,1410 -0,745 1,8121
∆GDP 864 0,0135 0,0239 -0,0711 0,0564
∆ECBPurchases 852 0,3718 2,4505 -8,6430 24,1920
Inflation 864 0,0190 0,0124 -0,0122 0,0559
∆Euribor6m 864 0,0220 0,0160 -0,0021 0,0518
∆Loans 852 0,0092 0,1061 -1,9468 0,6590
∆DoA 852 0,0044 0,1189 -0,7386 1,1819
∆Capital 852 -0,0055 0,2183 -4,8264 0,8727
∆PoA 852 -1,7243 38,936 -1050,727 193,283
∆TA 852 0,0166 0,054 -0,184 0,317
∆GDP 864 0,0091 0,0229 -0,0711 0,0559
∆ECBPurchases 852 2,0607 114,541 -964,858 1676,728
Inflation 864 0,0184 0,0114 -0,0151 0,0491






























Provisions ratio corresponds to the change of Provisions over Assets (PoA). This table 
summarized those variables for both small and large banks. The sample is divided equally in 
12 large and small banks, depending on its total assets4. As one can conclude, both types of 
banks have similar descriptive statistics concerning the average of ∆𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠, ∆𝑃𝑜𝐴 and ∆𝐷𝑜𝐴. 
However, capital levels of small banks tend to be larger than the ones of big banks. As stated 
by Ueda and Weder di Mauro (2012) and Noss and Sowerbutts (2012), a small capital buffer is 
expected for big banks due to its lower costs in funding and the easiness to access capital 
markets, taking advantage in the implicit government guarantee. When comparing the standard 
deviation, small banks present greater dispersions than big banks, perhaps due its heterogeneity, 
because it can be included in the sample medium to very small banks.  
Regarding the variable ECBPurchases, one may see that, in average, the volume of asset 
acquisitions under the QE program is higher in small banks which may lead to the conclusion 
that the effect of QE can be more important for small rather than big banks.  
 
One can take a closer look at the evolution of the deposit ratio, meaning to the DoA ratio, in 
Figure 6. Since 1999 a stable evolution of the ratio can be observed, which can be explained by 
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Figure 6  - Quarterly growth of Deposits over Assets 
 
Figure 5 - Quarterly growth of Loans 
 




banks that had been financing their activity through non-deposits liabilities, and Deposits over 
Asset became lower for Big Banks. This happened due to the fact that financial market became 
more accessible and the appearance of complex funding instruments (as for example, 
securitizations). One can witness that since 2011, a particular growth in loans and in the deposit 
ratio which matches the beginning of ECB’s liquidity programs (LTROs, CBPP and SMP)5. 
Nevertheless, one should not over interpret this evidence, because there are other increases in 
the series that are not explain by ECB’s policies.  
In Figure 5, it can be show that either small or big banks faced a decrease in lending after the 
financial crisis and after the beginning of ECB’s program small banks’ lending became negative 
while big banks’ lending increased. Lending in both types of banks got better in 2015, after the 
announcement of QE. 
3.2 Econometric Strategy 
As mentioned on Section 2, changes in deposits due to QE can influence bank’s lending. In 
order to analyze the impact of QE on commercial banks, Joyce and Spaltro (2014) econometric 
strategy is followed. 
This study will focus on understanding the reaction of the growth of loans to the growth in the 
deposit ratio (∆𝐷𝑜𝐴). Loans’ growth will work as an endogenous variable following Kashyap 
and Stein’s (2000) investigation which focused on the mechanism of bank lending taking into 




, Bernanke and Lown (1991) studied the effects of lending growth. The general 
model can be written as follows: 
                                                          
5 Long-term refinancing operations (LTROs) were announced on October 2008, Covered Bond Purchase 
Program (CBBP) in May 2009 and Securities Program (SMP) in May 2010. 




∆𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝐿)∆𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾(𝐿)∆𝐷𝑜𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿(𝐿)∆𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌(𝐿)∆𝑃𝑜𝐴𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜑∆𝐸𝐶𝐵𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇
′𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃
′𝐴𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
where ∆𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 corresponds the growth of loans (lending) on a quarterly basis for bank 𝑖 in 
period 𝑡, ∆𝐷𝑜𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the quarterly deposits over assets ratio growth, ∆𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 is the quarterly 
capital growth, ∆𝑃𝑜𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the quarterly provisions over assets growth, ∆𝐸𝐶𝐵𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 is 
change in ECB’s purchases6, the   𝐼𝑖𝑡 is a vector of micro controls and 𝐴𝑡 is a vector of macro 
controls. 𝐿 is a lag operator and 𝛽(𝐿), 𝛾(𝐿), 𝛿(𝐿) and 𝜌(𝐿) are lag polynomials. Additionally 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 corresponds to the error term and it is assumed to be normally distributed 𝑁~(0, 𝜎
2), 
assuming that the error terms are independent both in the time and cross-section dimensions: 
𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡 , 𝑢𝑗𝑠) = 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, 𝑠 ≠ 𝑡. 
This corresponds to a dynamic model (Auto Regressive Distributed Lag) where the short-run 
effects are captured by the coefficients of the individual time lags and the long-run effects are 
capture by  
∑ lagged coefficients 
1−∑ lagged lending coefficients
 . 
The general model can be seen as a relationship between the demand and supply factors of 
lending, through macro and microeconomic variables, as bank’s individualities7. The 
macroeconomic controls are: GDP growth, Inflation and Interest Rate (Euribor 6m). The 
microeconomic variables, or bank’s individualities, are the bank’s size (Total Assets), the 
provision ratio (as an indicator of credit quality), Capital because it is a costly source of funding 
that can impact bank’s capacity to lend.  
                                                          
6 In order to correspond EBC’s Purchases to each bank, it was made a country-bank allocation. 
7 Kashyap and Stein (2000), Hoson (2006) and Kobayashi, Spiegel, and Yamori (2006) studies suggest that among 
banks the QE’s impact is different because it depends on bank’s features. Futhermore, Kashyap and Stein (2000) 
suggest that big banks face less credit constrains found because big banks are less sensitive to shocks in liquidity. 
Hosono (2006) suggests that the effect of QE is stronger for smaller banks, less liquid and more abundant with 
capital.  
(9) 




The variable ECBPurchases represents directly the asset purchase program, translating in 
quarter purchases by country, so we expect a positive and significant value, meaning that an 
increase in the ECB’s asset purchase will lead to a boost in lending growth. Moreover, as stated 
in Section 2, QE effects can be measure through Deposits, if bank lending is affect by QE 
through deposits, an increase in DoA leads to increase in bank’s lending capacity as long as the 
associated coefficients are positive and statistically significant.  
3.3 Unit-roots tests 
This panel dataset will be treated both as a cross-sectional and time-series dimension, so it can 
be regarded as a macro-panel since the number of time periods dominates over the number of 
banks. The panel data set is balanced with no missing values, so with all observations valid over 
the entire time-series period.  
The statistical properties of the sample regarding time are relevant for the decision on how 
variables in the model are to be measured, in particular, stationary of the series must be tested 
so that one can justify using (logs of) levels or first-differences of the observed data and, 
furthermore, in a cointegration context or not. This is also important to avoid spurious 
relationships. To that extend, we apply the panel unit root tests proposed by Im, Pesaran and 
Shin (2003). The null hypothesis is non-stationarity, with common or not, unit root processes 
across cross-sections. 
Table  2 – Unit roots tests (1st level)  
 
As one can see, the variables ECBPurchases and Euribor6m are both non-stationary, so we must 
take their first differences: 
∆Loans ∆DtA ∆Capital ∆PoA ∆TA ∆GDP ECBPurchases Inflation Euribor6m
p-value 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,010 1,000 0,037 1,000
Z-t-tilde-bar -28,964 -30,024 -29,898 -28,099 -34,026 -2,322 12,504 -1,788 5,873








The results presented were estimated using the Arellano-Bond approach in Stata software. One 
can see from Table 7 that not all coefficients are significant, but all will be interpreted with their 
respective signs. 








A statistically significant effect was found for the first lag of the growth of Loans, indicating a 
robustness of the variable ∆𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠. The first lag of growth of Capital has negative and 
statistically significant impact ∆𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 in the first lag, this can be justified by the high cost that 
this source of funding has (Capital) compared to other sources. According to Mayers and Majluf 
(1984) a bank capital increase is expensive so it must adjust lending taking into consideration 
the negative impact on P&L. In the long run, the variable growth in Capital is positive, which 
does not contradict what was indicated previously because the level of capital, as mentioned in 
Section 2, relies with the bank capital channel. As one expected, there is a negative and statically 




∆Loans Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z|
L1.∆Loans -0,2693 0,0214 -12,5600 0,0000
∆DoA 0,2008 0,0100 20,0100 0,0000
∆Capital 0,0836 0,0113 7,4000 0,0000
∆PoA -0,0310 0,0075 -4,1100 0,0000
∆TA 0,3403 0,0241 14,1400 0,0000
∆GDP 0,1341 0,1426 0,9400 0,3470
∆ECBPurchases 0,0000 0,0000 0,9700 0,3340
Inflation 0,1098 0,2682 0,4100 0,6820
∆Euribor6m 0,7246 0,2129 3,4000 0,0010
L1.∆DtA -0,0116 0,0114 -1,0200 0,0030
L1.∆Capital -0,0129 0,0074 -1,7300 0,0830
L1.∆PoA 0,0175 0,0112 1,5600 0,1190



















significant impact of the provisions ratio, as banks decline the concession of loans when the 
quality of those begins to be bad and predicted future losses are higher. Total Assets which 
measures the size of the bank has statistically significant and positive effect in lending growth, 
so in theory, big banks concede more loans than small banks. The variable that states the ECB’s 
purchases is not statistically significant, this can be explained by the fact that the QE program 
only started in 2015.  
Focusing on the macroeconomic variables, both GDP and Inflation are not statistically 
significant for the model, but changes in Euribor 6m are, this can be explained by the fact that 
this rate influences positively the demand in lending. 
As a robustness check, the sample was divided in big and small banks based on their Total 
Assets at the end of 2016.  
4.2 Big Banks 
Similar to the evidence stated before, the growth in assets and the changes in the Euribor 6m 







There is not much change in the results compared to the analysis done before, nevertheless, 
ECB purchases, even though is not statistically significant, has an impact, yet small, in the 
Tabel 8 - Arellano-Bond estimation for big banks 
 ∆Loans Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z|
L1.∆Loans -0,3747 0,0313 -11,9700 0,0000
∆DoA 0,0036 0,0256 0,1400 0,0470
∆Capital 0,0515 0,0230 2,2400 0,0250
∆PoA -0,1636 0,0187 -8,7600 0,0000
∆TA 0,3584 0,0330 10,8700 0,0000
∆GDP 0,0694 0,1950 0,3600 0,7220
∆ECBPurchases 0,0009 0,0014 0,6500 0,5140
Inflation 0,2765 0,3690 0,7500 0,4540
Euribor6m 0,7313 0,2953 2,4800 0,0130
L1.∆DtA -0,0062 0,0267 -0,2300 0,8160
L1.∆Capital 0,0017 0,0139 0,1200 0,0405
L1.∆PoA -0,0355 0,0191 -1,8600 0,0630



















growth of Loans. Additionally, the contribution of the growth of DoA, both in long and short 
run, continues to be positive and statistically significant for the model, but the coefficient 
compared with the sample of all banks is much lower.   
4.3 Small Banks 
In small banks, the variables which contribute most to the model are, in line of what was stated 







In comparison with the big banks’ case, the contribution of Deposits over Assets is higher 
statistically significant and positive to the lending growth, both in the short and long run. For 
small banks, there are more statistically significant on variables such as Provisions over Assets 
and Deposits over Assets. The impact of Capital, both positive and statistically significant in 
both type of banks, is slightly higher in small banks when comparing to big banks case, it is 
quite interesting to realize the importance of capital to small banks rather for big banks, as stated 
by Hosono (2006) “the effect of QE is stronger for smaller banks, less liquid and more abundant 
with capital.”.   
Kashyap and Stein (1994, 2000) found that this type of heterogeneity these type of banks is 
quite normal in the literature because there is a bank lending channel. Small banks face 
Tabel 9 - Arellano-Bond estimation for small banks 
 ∆Loans Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z|
L1.∆Loans -0,1384 0,0278 -4,9700 0,0000
∆DoA 0,2340 0,0110 21,2100 0,0000
∆Capital 0,0690 0,0138 5,0000 0,0000
∆PoA 0,0009 0,0079 0,1100 0,9130
∆GDP 0,0014 0,1788 0,0100 0,9940
∆TA 0,2925 0,0624 4,6900 0,0000
∆ECBPurchases 0,0000 0,0000 1,2200 0,2230
Inflation -0,1581 0,3361 -0,4700 0,6380
Euribor6m 0,4443 0,2536 1,7500 0,0800
L1.∆DtA 0,0653 0,0138 4,7400 0,0000
L1.∆Capital 0,0235 0,0229 1,0300 0,3050
L1.∆PoA -0,0089 0,0077 -1,1500 0,2500



















difficulties in accessing capital markets in order to increase its non-deposit liabilities, so a stress 
situation in deposits will lead to a deeper reduction in lending than in big banks (higher impact). 
Unfortunately, the variable ECB purchases remains not statistically significant, not contributing 
to the model, but for both cases if we focus on the effect through deposits it can be verified the 
positive impact of QE on bank’s lending. 
5 Conclusion and Limitations 
In this paper the goal was to investigate the impact of QE on commercial banks in the Euro 
Area since most studies focus on the economy impact. This research takes into consideration 
publicly available information on 24 European commercial banks during a period of 68 quarters 
(1Q1999 to 4Q2016).  
Over the years, less attention was given to the impact of QE on commercial banks, because 
policy makers expected QE to impact financial markets mainly aiming to get close to a 2% 
inflation rate. Nevertheless, there are studies that focused on the impact of QE in commercial 
banks such as Bowman et al (2011) in the Japan’s case and Joyce and Spaltro (2014) in the 
UK’s case. These studies pointed out statistical significant but small increase in the growth of 
bank lending.  
In this study, we find some evidence that QE had a bigger impact on small banks rather than on 
big banks, reaching to the conclusion that the effects were heterogeneous. Additionally, 
evidence was found regarding the positive impact of banks with higher levels of capital on QE, 
this can explain the little effect found because during the financial crisis bank’s capital had a 
massive decrease. Overall, the effect of QE on commercial banks was measured to be small, 
the variable ECB Purchases turned out to be not statistically significant to the model, and 
nevertheless the QE’s effect was captured by the ratio DoA. So, taking that into account, there 
is a statically significant, but small effect in launching this unconventional monetary policy in 




commercial banks, affecting its lending channel, allowing banks to increase lending and boost 
their profits.  
One may infer that, this small effect of QE on commercial banks can be explained by the lack 
of confidence in the banking system that is recovering at a slow rate since the financial crisis. 
The negative impact of the financial crisis could have overwhelmed the positive impact of QE, 
leading to a small effect of this unconventional monetary policy. Moreover, the effects can be 
limited because the marginal effects that were estimated using deposits are minor and because 
it was supposed that the total effect of QE was capture in its whole by deposits, overstating the 
impact. 
Even though this work project reached its goal, there were some limitations. The lack of time 
in order to observe an impact of QE on commercial banks, through the variable ECB Purchases, 
because that policy was only implemented in 2015. Furthermore, also due to this last fact, there 
is lack of available data which constrains the scope of the analysis and lack of previous research 
on this topic in the Euro Area. The available data concerning the bank’s BS was also a 
limitation, since the impact of ECB Purchases was not capture entirely since not all banks 
placed in the Euro Area were considered in this study because there was no publicly available 
data for. These limitations are an opportunity to describe the need for future research and 
identify new gaps in the literature. 
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Intesa Sanpaolo Group Italy
Commerzbank Germany




Banco Popular Espanhol Spain
Mediobanca SpA Italy
Banco Comercial Português Portugal
Bankinter Spain
BPER Emilia Romagna Italy




 HSBC Trinkaus & Burkhardt Germany
Oberbank AG Austria
Comdirect bank Germany
















Annex 2  
 








Monthly net purchases (M€) 31-03-2015 30-06-2015 30-09-2015 31-12-2015 31-03-2016 30-06-2016 30-09-2016 30-12-2016
Austria 1,22        3,83        3,71        3,89        4,06        6,05        5,12        5,33        
Belgium 1,53        4,84        4,64        4,89        5,13        7,65        6,45        6,72        
Cyprus -          -           98,00       187,00     16,00 -      -          21,00 -      -           
Germany 11,07      35,26       33,75       35,54       37,20       55,45      46,80       48,87       
Estonia -          5,00        33,00       10,00       13,00       5,00        -           -           
Spain 5,45        17,30       16,56       17,51       18,34       28,18      23,05       23,94       
Finland 774,00    2.463,00  2.362,00  2.487,00  2.615,00  3,91        873,40     941,46     
France 8,76        27,54       27,04       28,44       29,81       44,01      36,95       38,33       
Ireland 722,00    2.294,00  2.234,00  2.333,00  2.393,00  3,28        2.665,00  1.628,02  
Italy 7,61        23,98       23,20       24,42       25,59       39,21      32,15       33,45       
Lithuania 39,00      339,00     394,00     335,00     343,00     322,00    193,00     299,00     
Luxembourg 183,00    550,00     304,00     78,00       423,00     77,00      16,00       112,00     
Latvia 75,00      428,00     64,00       117,00     115,00     224,00    144,00     145,00     
Malta 5,00        204,00     53,00       20,00       141,00     163,00    30,00       191,00     
the Netherlands 2,49        7,86        7,47        7,80        8,39        12,36      10,59       10,87       
Portugal 1,07        3,42        968,31     3,45        3,62        4,29        1.681,02  728,04     
Slovenia 209,00    678,00     651,00     690,00     769,00     732,00    595,00     609,00     
Slovakia 506,00    1.597,00  1.332,00  1.187,00  1.562,00  885,00    477,00     610,00     
Supranationals 5,68        18,19       18,03       18,21       18,87       23,45      18,95       19,85       
Total 47,38      150,77     145,19     151,59     159,37     230,24    190,14     198,15     
Variable Source Formula
∆Loans Bloomberg  - Balance Sheet Total Loans
∆DtA Bloomberg  - Balance Sheet Total Assets and Deposits
∆Capital Bloomberg  - Balance Sheet Total Capital
∆PoA Bloomberg  - Provisions for Loan Loss and  Balance Sheet Total Assets
∆TA Bloomberg  - Balance Sheet Total Assets
∆GDP OECD Database
∆ECBPurchases European Central Bank website
Inflation OECD Database






Deustche Bank 1 692 872,68 €     
Santander 1 339 125,00 €     
Unicredit 859 533,00 €        
ING Group 845 081,00 €        
BBVA 731 854,00 €        
Intesa Sanpaolo Group 725 100,00 €        
Commerzbank 480 450,00 €        
Banco de Sabadell 212 507,72 €        
Erste Bank 208 227,07 €        
Dexia 203 987,91 €        
Banca MPS 153 132,00 €        
Banco Popular Espanhol 147 925,73 €        
Mediobanca SpA 93 439,85 €          
Banco Comercial Português 71 264,80 €          
Bankinter 67 182,47 €          
BPER Emilia Romagna 64 957,03 €          
Banca Popolare di Milano 50 829,22 €          
Credito Emiliano 39 569,03 €          
BPI 38 284,70 €          
Banca Carige 26 119,30 €          
 HSBC Trinkaus & Burkhardt 22 386,21 €          
Oberbank AG 20 086,81 €          
Comdirect bank 19 273,46 €          
Bank fur tirol und vorarlberg 9 655,14 €           
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